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1. The title of this Article is a reference to the popular website http://
icanhascheezburger.com. This website allows users to upload humorous photographs of
cats or “lolcats” (shorthand for cat photographs that make you laugh out loud) with
accompanying speech captions. After users vote on which pictures are the funniest, the
website features the most popular photos. The collective joke within this website is that
many of the cats speak with poor grammar and spelling. By exemplifying how
participatory culture fosters user participation, a sense of community, and a shared
identity among Internet users, the whimsical icanhascheezburger.com is in sharp contrast
with the culture of the legal profession, which emphasizes proper language, measured
behavior, and formality. See, e.g., Jenna Wortham, Once Just a Site with Funny Cat
Pictures and Now a Web Empire, N.Y. TIMES, Jun. 13, 2010, available at http://www.ny
times.com/2010/06/14/technology/internet/14burger.html.
* Associate Professor, Atlanta’s John Marshall Law School.
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I. Introduction
The Internet allows citizens to comment on public affairs with an
amplified and unfiltered voice, creating an open, community-based
culture where robust debate flourishes. Users now have the
autonomy to produce cultural meanings outside of traditional
institutions such as large-scale media outlets and government entities.
This new Internet-based culture of sharing and commenting has been
2
labeled “participatory culture.” However, some of the ideals and
practices of participatory culture clash with the traditional legal
culture as it exists in the United States. Specifically, professional
conflicts are emerging with respect to blogs and emails where lawyers
air caustic, uncensored, and highly critical views of the legal
profession and the judiciary. Although these online narratives often
reflect a view that the structure of the legal system is badly broken,
they may also run afoul of professional norms or ethical rules that
prohibit attorneys from impugning the integrity of the legal system.
This Article’s thesis is that as the democratic ideals inherent in
participatory culture become more deeply embedded in our society,
the legal profession should also evolve and embrace a more pluralistic
and unconstrained approach toward professionalism.
As I have written previously, the legal culture within the United
States is a straight-laced culture, highly dependent on formalism and
3
hierarchy. Cultural meanings, such as what it means to be a lawyer
and the correct legal analysis that flows from a case, are tightly
4
5
controlled by few—law professors, judges, and institutions, such as
2. A participatory culture is “a culture with relatively low barriers to artistic
expression and civil engagement, strong support for creating and sharing one’s creations,
and some type of informal mentorship whereby what is known by the most experienced is
passed along to novices.” Henry Jenkins et al., Confronting the Challenges of Participatory
Culture: Media Education for the 21st Century 3 (2006), available at http://digital
learning.macfound.org/atf/cf/%7B7E45C7E0-A3E0-4B89-AC9C-E807E1B0AE4E%7D/
JENKINS_WHITE_PAPER.PDF.
3. See generally, Lucille A. Jewel, Bourdieu and American Legal Education: How
Law Schools Reproduce Social Stratification and Class Hierarchy, 56 BUFF. L. REV. 1155
(2008).
4. The law professor controls legal meanings by structuring classroom dialogue to
emphasize precedent and procedure, which tends to greatly limit the story of what
happens in a case. See ELIZABETH MERTZ, THE LANGUAGE OF LAW SCHOOL 54–56
(2007) (theorizing, from an ethnographic standpoint, how legal educational institutions
reproduce formalistic thinking).
5. The Cardozo-penned Palsgraf decision illustrates how judicial authors use the
clipped prose of legal formalism to strip all personal information and social context from a
case. See Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 248 N.Y. 339 (1928); JOHN T. NOONAN, JR.,
PERSONS AND MASKS OF THE LAW 112–13 (1976). Jerome Frank also critiqued Cardozo
for using “a private time-machine to transport himself back into 18th Century England” in
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6

the American Bar Association (“ABA”). With respect to commonly
accepted narratives for the legal profession and proper legal analysis
in the classroom or courtroom, an analogy can be made to the “oneto-many” model of mass media communication, where a few large
7
entities controlled most of the information. Now, technology has
given everyone the ability to comment and participate in the creation
of cultural meanings. The Internet also enables users to comment
and critique with real-time immediacy, in contrast to the slower pace
8
by which meaning was created in the older mass media system. Now
that we are living in a “many-to-many” media environment, a culture
clash is emerging within the legal profession where professional rules
and norms have heretofore enforced a culture of restraint.
This cultural conflict can be seen in electronic narratives that go
9
“viral,” where lawyers comment on the lack of humanism within big
law firm firing practices, expose the alienating work environments
experienced by low-level contract attorneys, or criticize judges who
show hostility toward criminal defense attorneys. Within these

order to translate “himself into a past alien speech environment.” Anon Y. Mous (Jerome
Frank), The Speech of Judges: A Dissenting Opinion, 29 VA. L. REV. 625, 631 (1943).
Cardozo’s language allowed him to promote his prose as reasoned analysis when, in Judge
Posner’s view, it was really a “substitution of words for thought.” RICHARD A. POSNER,
CARDOZO: A STUDY IN REPUTATION 119 (1990). Excised from Cardozo’s opinion are the
facts that Mrs. Palsgraf was a “very poor” mother of three children who made $416 a year
as a house cleaner with substantial legal and medical debts. NOONAN, supra, at 125–28.
6. Through its model rules of professional conduct (adopted by most states), the
ABA is an institution that controls the meanings with respect to lawyer professionalism.
See Amy R. Mashburn, Professionalism as Class Ideology: Civility Codes and Bar
Hierarchy, 28 VAL. U. L. REV. 657, 672–73 (1994) (offering a perspective of the ABA’s
model rules of professional conduct as the product of a few elite lawyers imposing their
own view of professional conduct that excludes minority views).
7. See, e.g., CLAY SHIRKY, HERE COMES EVERYBODY 86 (2008) (explaining
traditional mass media communication as a “one-to-many” model); YOCHAI BENKLER,
THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS: HOW SOCIAL PRODUCTION TRANSFORMS MARKETS AND
FREEDOM 3 (2006) (explaining how new technology now allows nonmarket participants to
produce information in a decentralized way, in contrast with the older mass-media
regime).
8. MANUEL CASTELLS, THE RISE OF THE NETWORK SOCIETY 491 (2010).
9. The Internet allows information to reach viral dimensions and impact a mass
audience in much the same way that a viral disease gets transmitted to the public. See
Eytan Adar & Lada A. Adamic, Tracking Information Epidemics in Blogspace, 2005 INST.
ELECTRICAL & ELECTRONICS ENG’RS COMPUTER SOC’Y CONF. ON WEB INTELLIGENCE
1–2, available at www.cond.org/trackingblogepidemics.pdf; David Kempe, Jon Kleinberg
& Eva Tardos, Maximizing the Spread of Influence Through a Social Network, 9 ASS’N
COMPUTING MACHINERY SPECIAL INT. GROUP ON KNOWLEDGE DISCOVERY & DATA
MINING 137 (2003); Limor Shifman & Mike Thelwall, Assessing Global Diffusion with
Web Memetics: The Spread and Evolution of a Popular Joke, 60 J. AM. SOC’Y INFO. SCI. &
TECH. 2567, 2567 (2009).
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electronic forums, lawyers regularly speak out against the characters
(such as the law school administrators, judges, and elite attorneys)
who they perceive to wield arbitrary power over them. Often using a
sarcastic and caustic tone, these narratives portray the practice of law
as a dark, lonely, and alienating experience.
These narratives question commonly held perceptions of what it
means to be a lawyer and disclose experiences at odds with traditional
understandings of a lawyer’s professional identity. From a critical
standpoint, they portray a broken legal profession, implicitly arguing
that the liberal humanism the profession supposedly embodies does
not apply to all lawyers. These stories are, in effect, structural
critiques of the profession. Penned by the outliers of the legal
profession, they provide a culturally valuable perspective on what it
means to be an American lawyer in the twenty-first century.
Nonetheless, such critical postings conflict with the notion that
attorneys should not criticize the integrity of the legal profession or
10
the judiciary. However, because they afford a valuable critique of
the profession, professional norms and ethical rules should not
operate to shut out these stories. It is a positive development that
technology gives ordinary attorneys the power to inform the culture
of the profession, as opposed to previous models where only elite and
11
powerful practitioners were given a voice.
Part II of this Article describes the characteristics of participatory
culture relevant to the legal profession. Part III explores the
emerging format of the online lawyer narrative, and Part IV discusses
its cultural value. Part V analyzes the professionalism issues raised by
these new narratives.

II. Participatory Culture
“The term, participatory culture, contrasts with older notions of
12
passive media spectatorship.” Consumers and media producers no

10. See e.g., John Schwartz, A Legal Battle: Online Attitude vs. Rules of the Bar, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 13, 2009, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/13/us/
13lawyers.html (detailing recent conflicts between attorneys who blog about their
professional experiences and bar ethics rules).
11. Control over cultural meanings within the law profession is exemplified by the
ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct, which were first promulgated at the
beginning of the twentieth century by the most elite members of the bar and continue to
be molded by leadership within the ABA, the majority of which consists of attorneys with
corporate law firm practices. See Mashburn, supra note 6, at 663, 669, 673 (1994).
12. HENRY JENKINS, CONVERGENCE CULTURE: WHERE OLD AND NEW MEDIA
COLLIDE 3 (2006) [hereinafter JENKINS, CONVERGENCE CULTURE].

2011]

I CAN HAS LAWYER?

345

longer operate in separate roles; instead, they interact with each other
13
under a new paradigm. For example, a person purchasing a product
on Amazon.com might function as a traditional passive consumer
buying a product in the marketplace. However, technology also
opens up the potential for the consumer to actively produce
information about the product, by writing an online review. On the
Internet, “[t]he producers are the audience, the act of making is the
act of watching, and every link is both a point of departure and a
14
destination.”
A culture of sharing and collaborating, often outside traditional
economic incentives, is one of the hallmarks of participatory culture.
New technology has created a marked increase “in our ability to
share, to cooperate with one another, and to take collective action, all
15
outside the framework of traditional institutions and organizations.”
People are also demonstrating a remarkable eagerness to contribute
to online social projects even though they do not receive direct
16
economic compensation from these activities. Instead of economic
fruits, persons contribute to projects out of simple altruistic desire or
17
because of the ego boost that comes from seeing their work online.
Clay Shirky offers Wikipedia and Linux as examples of successful
projects that have capitalized on the phenomenon of people desiring
18
to collectively participate and contribute to reach an end goal. In
the case of open-source software Linux, companies such as IBM have
demonstrated that it is possible to profit from a product that is not
19
owned in the traditional sense.
Community is another central theme within participatory
20
culture.
New interactive media technology fosters new kinds of

13. Id.
14. Kevin Kelly, We Are the Web, WIRED, Aug. 2005, available at http://www.wired
.com/wired/archive/13.08/tech.html.
15. SHIRKY, supra note 7, at 21.
16. Id. at 132–33. See also, BENKLER, supra note 7, at 7 (explaining that new
technology has fostered a “robust ethic of open sharing,” where production is longer
dependent on exclusive property rights).
17. SHIRKY, supra note 7, at 132–33; ERIC S. RAYMOND, THE CATHEDRAL AND THE
BAZAAR 53 (2001).
18. SHIRKY, supra note 7, at 137, 239–40.
19. BENKLER, supra note 7, at 124; see also, SHIRKY, supra note 7 at 258–59 (“What
the open source movement teaches us is that the communal can be at least as durable as
the commercial.”).
20. Mary Chayko defines “community” as a “set of people who share a special kind
of identity and culture and regular, patterned social interaction.” MARY CHAYKO,
PORTABLE COMMUNITIES: THE SOCIAL DYNAMICS OF ONLINE AND MOBILE
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social communities, defined by common interests rather than by
21
geography, which make valuable contributions to a society. People
can now customize their social relations in ways that fit them better.
Instead of relying on preexisting institutions (such as schools,
religious institutions, churches, the Rotary Club, etc.) to meet one’s
need for social connectivity, individuals can seek out new community
22
relationships based on subjects that interest them.
In online
communities, members develop a shared repertoire and shared
23
language, often developing “in-jokes” and specialized jargon that
24
While some critics argue that
apply to the group’s identity.
25
technology has made life more alienating and lonely, others argue
that the Internet enables people to “form real, consequential bonds
with people [they] have never met face to face—and in this world of
wireless computers and mobile devices [they] can do it nearly all the
26
time, everywhere [they] go.”
Technology has also opened up discourse to many more
27
individuals, leading to a freer flow of information and content.
Participatory culture contains new opportunities for “civic

CONNECTEDNESS 6 (2008). In a community, there is a sense of neighborliness, warmth,
support, and belonging. Id.
21. Henry Jenkins et al., Confronting the Challenges of Participatory Culture: Media
Education for the 21st Century 50 (2006), available at http://www.macfound.org (search for
“Participatory Culture”) [hereinafter Confronting the Challenges of Participatory Culture]
(explaining how digital networks “tap the participation of large-scale social
communities.”); CHAYKO, supra note 20 at 29 (explaining how online communities
emerge when “people who may be spatially separated focus on the same things, in much
the same way, at the same time.”).
22. BENKLER, supra note 7, at 367. One example of a robust online community
would be the some ten million persons who play the online game World of Warcraft. See
CASTELLS, supra note 8, at xxix.
23. K. Guldberg and R. Pilkington, A Community of Practice Approach to the
Development of Non-Traditional Learners Through Networked Learning, 22 J. COMPUTER
ASSISTED LEARNING 159, 161 (2006).
24. One example of a shared jargon would be the term “hacker,” which originated at
MIT’s Tech model railroad club, but came to mean a computer “enthusiast, . . . artist,
tinkerer, [] problem solver, [and] an expert.” RAYMOND, supra note 17, at xii, 4.
Computer acronyms, such as “LOL” (laugh out loud), “IMHO” (in my humble opinion),
and “ROFL” (roll on the floor laughing) also originated as a shared vocabulary within the
hacker community but have now entered mainstream culture.
See WIKIPEDIA,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/LOL (last visited Apr. 7, 2011).
25. CASTELLS, supra note 8, at 387.
26. CHAYKO, supra note 20, at 3.
27. See JENKINS, CONVERGENCE CULTURE, supra note 12, at 18 (explaining how
new media “raise[s] expectations of a freer flow of ideas and content” and inspires
consumers to participate more fully in their culture.”).
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engagement, political empowerment, and economic advancement.”
New Media theorist Yochai Benkler argues that the new information
environment has the potential to increase democratic participation
29
and ultimately foster a more critical and self-reflective culture. It is
no longer necessary to be affiliated with a powerful industrial or state
30
institution in order to disseminate information in a mass format.
The decentralization of information production creates more
opportunities for citizens to perform the watchdog function of society,
31
to critique and observe public affairs. Thus, the relative ease by
which information can be disseminated en masse has led to a more
32
transparent and malleable culture. Participants can be more “selfreflective and critical of the culture they occupy, thereby enabling
them to become more self-reflective participants in conversations
33
within that culture.”
New technology also has the capacity to improve individual
autonomy. Citizens are now able to “participate in public
conversation continuously and pervasively, not as passive recipients
of ‘received wisdom’ from professional talking heads, but as active
participants in conversations carried out at many levels of political
34
and social structure.” Moreover, by authoring and disseminating
narratives based on their own experiences, people can engage in “new
35
practices of self-directed agency as a lived experience.” Although
the most optimistic technophile view expressed at the dawn of the
Internet Age in the 1990s—that the Internet would solve all of the
world’s social problems—has not come to pass, the Internet has
nonetheless led to great improvements in our culture, when compared
36
to the earlier mass-media driven culture.
A final attribute of participatory culture is its immediacy—events
37
can be commented upon in realtime as they are unfolding. This

28. Jenkins et al., supra note 12, at 8.
29. BENKLER, supra note 7, at 2.
30. Id. at 4.
31. Id. at 11.
32. Id. at 15.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 130.
35. Id. at 137.
36. Although Yochai Benkler dismisses the view that the Internet has wholly
revolutionized the structure of democracy in the public sphere, he maintains that new
technology has led to a vastly improved information landscape compared to the older
mass-media model. See id. at 10, 212–15.
37. CASTELLS, supra note 8, at 491; see also Andrew Keen, Twitter vs CNN: Blood
on the Streets, THE TELEGRAPH, (Jun. 23, 2009, 6:01 PM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk
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immediacy, enabled by new media communication forms such as
Twitter and blogs, represents a substantial change from the slower
paced and highly filtered mass-media information dissemination
model.
Citizens around the world are now using real-time
communication devices to stage spontaneous political protests and
38
publicize governmental abuses as they occur.
In addition to the temporal change in how information is
disseminated, the Internet also enables public support for an issue to
39
build very quickly. Internet stories that receive a great amount of
public interest have the power to demand action from institutions that
usually move at a much slower pace. Clay Shirky gives the example
of Evan Guttman, who, frustrated by the New York City Police
Department’s refusal to change a report of a phone from missing to
40
stolen, turned to the Internet for public support.
Mr. Guttman
wrote about his frustration with the NYPD on a website devoted to
41
the subject of retrieving the stolen phone. Within a matter of days,
the website generated so much public interest in the phone and the
police’s handling of the matter that the NYPD changed its course and
42
agreed to alter the report. Without the Internet’s ability to quickly
harness public support for his plight, Mr. Guttman would have had to
resort to more prolonged and possibly futile bureaucratic processes to
43
change the police report. Thus, in contrast to the time-consuming
task of requesting action from traditional institutions and
bureaucracies, new technology can provide a quicker way of getting
44
things done.
If we accept a technophile view of the Internet, we can say that we
have an emergent culture that is making our society more open,
transparent, and egalitarian. Individuals have more chances to forge
social connections across long distances that give their lives deeper
meaning. Technology has also given individuals more autonomy in
that they are able to disseminate cultural critiques to mass audiences.
But what happens when the open ideals of participatory culture
/technology/5614541/Twitter-vs-CNN-Blood-on-the-streets.html (discussing the view that
“instantaneous decentralized Twitter [is] the speedy future [of journalism]” and CNN
represents “the all-too-pedestrian past.”).
38. BENKLER, supra note 7, at 219; SHIRKY, supra note 7, at 184–87.
39. SHIRKY, supra note 7, at 12 (noting that “a story can go from local to global in a
heartbeat.”).
40. Id. at 5.
41. Id. at 5–6.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 13–14.
44. Id. at 22.
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interact with the more closed system of American legal culture? We
are seeing friction between these two worlds with the appearance of
online, lawyer-penned narratives that offer cynically dark views of the
practice of law. The next sections will study these new narratives and
analyze the professionalism conflicts that they raise.

III. Online Lawyer Narratives
A. The Online Narrative Format

The Internet has led to a “radical increase in the number of
45
storytellers and the qualitative diversity of stories told.” Users can
now tell stories across a variety of platforms, through emails,
threaded posts, online debates, profiles, web log postings, and profile
46
These new narratives play a valuable role in our
descriptions.
society, leading to new types of communities and more individual
autonomy. User stories engender the formation of new communities
47
In
by fostering a collective identity and sense of togetherness.
addition to the benefits of forming community bonds, online
narratives also provide a way for individuals, previously silenced
48
under mass media information regimes, to comment on their culture.
B. New Media Lawyer Narratives

Within the legal profession, the Internet has enabled a new kind
of lawyer-penned narrative stories that function outside the confines
of the traditional culture of the American legal profession. Some of
these stories detail the alienation, exclusionary hierarchy, and lack of
humanity in the legal job marketplace. Other online lawyer narratives
expose the hypocritical aspects of a broken criminal justice system
that insists on deference and respect for judges, even when those
judges exercise power over criminal defense attorneys and their
clients in unfair and unjust ways. Viewed collectively, these new
narratives portray the practice of law as a dismal enterprise and
question the traditional wisdom that the legal profession is a “noble
profession” whose members dispense wisdom from high-level

45. BENKLER, supra note 7, at 166.
46. CHAYKO, supra note 20, at 31 (positing the view that much of online
communication can be characterized as people sharing narratives and stories).
47. Id. at 33–34.
48. BENKLER, supra note 7, at 15.
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positions and never have to worry about issues of financial stability.
The next three sections will explore these new narratives.
1. New Media Lawyer Narratives as Tales of Economic Stress and
Alienation

Some emerging new media lawyer stories are viewable as a
reaction to the current economic stresses within the legal profession,
particularly the alarming trend of law firms cutting jobs; delegating
low-level legal tasks to temporary “staff attorneys” who are paid by
the hour and receive no benefits; and outsourcing legal work
50
overseas.
The dire economic climate coupled with the legal profession’s
hierarchical elitism has exacerbated the plight of attorneys who
attend lesser ranked law schools (often borrowing excessive sums of
money to do so). As the effects of the Great Recession continue to
buffet the legal job market, attorneys from the most prestigious
schools, previously assured a “golden ticket” in terms of a high salary
at a big firm upon graduation, are facing newfound employment
51
Because the legal profession adheres to a rigid
challenges.
52
hierarchical structure when it comes to educational qualifications,
the job situation for law graduates at the lower end of the prestige
53
ladder is even bleaker. The result is that a large number of attorneys

49. See Jewel, supra note 3, at 1178, 1220 (explaining the traditional understanding
that lawyers are members of a noble profession who impart wisdom, occupy positions of
power, do good things in society, and never seem to worry about making a living). See
also Mashburn, supra note 6, at 668 (explaining that the dominant professional ideology of
law portrays the lawyer as an aristocratic character who is not to be trifled with monetary
concerns).
50. See generally, Larry E. Ribstein, The Death of Big Law, 2010 WISC. L. REV. 749
(explaining how recent economic trends are negatively affecting the traditional “big-law”
firm business model); Marc S. Galanter & William D. Henderson, The Elastic
Tournament: The Second Transformation of the Big Law Firm, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1867,
1875–77 (2008) (explaining the trend of big law firms employing staff attorneys and
outsourcing strategies).
51. Gerry Shih, Downturn Dims Prospects Even At Top Law Schools, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 25, 2009, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/26/business/26lawyers.html
(explaining that even graduates from the most elite institutions—such as Yale and NYU—
are having difficulties securing jobs).
52. See Jewel, supra note 3, at 1181–85 (explaining that law degrees have differing
economic values depending on the perceived prestige of the granting institution).
53. See Amir Efrati, Hard Case: Job Market Wanes for U.S. Lawyers, WALL ST. J.,
Sept. 24, 2007, available at http://online.wsj.com/public/article_print/ SB11904078678083
5602.html (explaining the challenges that law graduates with non-elite credentials face in a
shrinking job market and discussing calls for more accountability in terms of law schools
reporting employment data concerning their graduates).
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from lower ranked schools are saddled with high amounts of student
54
debt, with no feasible way to pay it off.
A host of lawyer blogs such as Temporary Attorney: The
55
Sweatshop Edition (“Temporary Attorney”), But I Did Everything
56
57
58
59
Right, Esq. Never, Shilling Me Softly, and Third Tier Reality
expose the negative experiences of attorneys caught up in this system
60
of high student debt and limited job opportunities. The Third Tier
Reality blogger posts the following mission statement for his blog:
My goal is to inform potential law school students and
applicants of the ugly realities of attending law school. Do not
attend unless: (1) You get into a top 8 law school; (2) you get
a full-tuition scholarship to attend; (3) you have employment
as an attorney secured through a relative or close friend; or
(4) you are fully aware beforehand that your huge investment

54. Justin Pope, Analysis: Law Schools Growing, But Jobs Aren’t, LAW.COM, (June
17, 2008), http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1202422330611 (explaining the experience
of one recent law graduate, who was forced to move back in with his parents as he
searched for a legal job and struggled to pay off his student debts); Christine Hurt,
Minding Our Own Business Forum: Bubbles, Student Loans and Sub-Prime Debt, THE
CONGLOMERATE, (Apr. 19, 2010), http://www.theconglomerate.org/2010/04/death-of-biglaw-forum-bubbles-student-loans-and-subprime-debt.html (explaining that the practice of
investing in a legal education by borrowing heavily is analogous to the sub-prime
phenomenon in that both schemes rely on the faulty promise that the subject—real estate
and, in this case, a law degree—would consistently rise in value; the financial situation for
students attending lower ranked schools is especially dire, given the diminished value of a
law degree from those schools); Debra Cassens Weiss, 1/3 of Law Students Expect to
Graduate with 120K in Debt, ABA J., Jan. 6, 2010, http://www.abajournal.com
/news/article/almost_1_3_of_law_students_expect_to_graduate_with_120k_in_debt (1/3 of
American law students now expect to graduate with over $120,000 in student debt).
THE SWEATSHOP EDITION,
55. helpme123, TEMPORARY ATTORNEY:
http://temporaryattorney .blogspot.com/ (“With over 5,000 daily visitors, help expose the
nasty sweatshops, swindling law schools, and opportunistic staffing agencies.”) (last visited
Apr. 8, 2011).
56. BUT I DID EVERYTHING RIGHT!, http://butidideverythingrightorsoithought
.blogspot.com/ (“Everyday is a cloudy day in the life of a disenchanted lawyer.”) (last
visited Apr. 8, 2011.)
57. ESQ. NEVER, http://esqnever.blogspot.com/ (“I’m a 2nd Tier Toilet . . . err, Law
School Graduate who has realized that the law isn’t for me. I’ll be sharing my quest to find
a successful career in another field while also trying to expose the law school scam.”) (last
visited Apr. 8, 2011).
58. SHILLING ME SOFTLY, http://shillingmesoftly.blogspot.com (last visited Apr. 8,
2011).
59. NANDO, THIRD TIER REALITY, http://thirdtierreality.blogspot.com/ (last visited
Apr. 8, 2011).
60. Ashby Jones, Law Blog, Thinking About Law School? These Blogs Tell You Why
You Shouldn’t, WALL ST. J. LAW BLOG (Mar. 29, 2010, 1:58 PM), http://blogs.wsj.
com/law/2010/03/29/thinking-about-law-school-these-blogs-tells-you-why-you-shouldnt/.
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in time, energy, and money does not, in any way, guarantee a
61
job as an attorney or in the legal industry.
The reverse Horatio Alger themes within these blogs render them
emotionally compelling, but there is also a great bitterness to them.
The tone of these stories is often sarcastic and irreverent toward their
subjects. For instance, Temporary Attorney contains a list of “beastly
62
behavior awards.” These awards are for those who, in the authors’
view, perpetuate a system where law students, relying on law school
marketing materials touting lucrative law careers for its graduates,
63
borrow heavily from private lenders to attend law school. Upon
graduation, students find out that their law school’s optimistic tales of
64
career success are inaccurate and based on incomplete statistics. In
a series of postings entitled “Profiles in Hypocrisy,” the Third Tier
Reality blog posts caustic annotations of law schools’ marketing
65
materials, commenting on their inaccurate and misleading nature.
According to the critiques on these websites, instead of a lucrative
law career upon licensure, graduates of low-tier law schools, or
66
“toilet” law schools, encounter a stagnant job market where the only

61. Nando, THIRD TIER REALITY, supra note 59.
62. See, e.g., helpme123, Open Letter to Dean Richard Slimeball, TEMPORARY
ATTORNEY: THE SWEATSHOP EDITION, http://temporaryattorney.blogspot.com
/2009/11/open-letter-to-dean-richard-slimeball.html (Nov. 16, 2009, 9:59 AM) [hereinafter
Dean Richard Slimeball] (Dean Richard Matasar of New York Law School “won” the
Beastly Behavior award for 2009 for a perceived conflict of interest for serving as
chairman of the Access Group, a student lending organization, and for serving as the head
of New York Law School); helpme123, 2007 Beastly Behavior Award: Joan King,
TEMPORARY ATTORNEY: THE SWEATSHOP EDITION, http://temporaryattorney.blogspot.
com/2007/12/2007-beastly-behavior-award-joan-king.html (Dec. 27, 2007, 6:10 PM)
(Career Services Administrator Joan King, of Brooklyn Law School, “won” the beastly
behavior award for 2007 for allegedly publicizing optimistic, but incomplete, employment
data for Brooklyn Law Graduates). See also, Andrew P. Morriss & William D.
Henderson, Measuring Outcomes: Post-Graduation Measures of Success in the U.S. News
& World Report Law School Rankings, 83 IND. L.J. 791 (2008) (generally critiquing the
“gaming” strategies that law schools in engage in to maximize post-graduate employment
data, which in turn affects the schools’ U.S. News and World Report rankings).
63. See sources cited supra note 62.
64. See sources cited supra note 62.
65. Nando, Profiles in Hypocrisy: TTT Dean Thomas, THIRD TIER REALITY,
http://thirdtierreality.blogspot.com/2010/04/profiles-in-hypocrisy-ttt-dean-thomas.html
(Apr. 20, 2010, 5:35 AM).
66. One of the markers of an Internet community is a shared language or new type of
jargon. See supra notes 21–24 and accompanying text. On these websites, the word
“toilet” and the acronym TTT (third tier toilet) have emerged as terms for law schools
outside the top two tiers (the top 100 law schools) listed in U.S. News and World Report’s
annual ranking. See helpme123, Toilet Law Schools Popping Up, TEMPORARY
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available work is as a temporary attorney performing monotonous,
low-level law tasks (such as document review) with no client contact
67
and no opportunity to develop one’s legal skills. To make matters
worse, even temporary employment opportunities are shrinking,
driven in part by large law firms outsourcing this type of routine legal
68
work overseas, to places like India. Thus, other objects of ire on the
Temporary Attorney website include law business leaders who
champion outsourcing as a way for law firms to cut costs and increase
69
profits.
In addition to leveling harsh criticism for the profit seeking and
snobbery within the legal profession and legal education, these
websites provide an alternative narrative space for lawyers to share
their stories. For instance, through the posting and comment
functions on Temporary Attorney: The Sweatshop Edition,
anonymous temporary attorney bloggers exchange reports of
reviewing documents on computer screens for sixteen hours a day in
70
Workers must
poorly ventilated, cockroach-infested basements.
obtain permission to use the bathroom and are not allowed to leave
the premises to, for instance, walk outside to get a cup of coffee,
71
unless it is during the forty-five minute lunch time allocation.
Female attorney workers report being assaulted by other workers, yet
72
are too afraid to report the assault for fear of losing the job.

ATTORNEY: THE SWEATSHOP EDITION, http://temporaryattorney.blogspot.com/2008/06/
toilet-law-schools-popping-up.html (June 12, 2008, 3:24 PM).
67. See Arin Greenwood, Attorney at Blah, WASH. CITY PAPER, Nov. 19, 2007,
available at http://www.washingtoncitypaper.com/display.php?id=34054.
68. See Arin Greenwood, Manhattan Work at Mumbai Prices: Inside India’s Hottest
Legal Outsourcing Firm, 93 A.B.A. J. 36, 40 (2007), available at http://abajournal.
com/magazine/manhattan_work_at_mumbai_prices/; Daniel Brook, Made in India: Are
Your Lawyers In New York or New Delhi, LEGAL AFFAIRS, May/June 2005, available at
http://www.legalaffairs.org/issues/May-June-2005/scene_brook_ mayjun05.msp.
69. See helpme123, Beastly Behavior Award: David Perla, TEMPORARY ATTORNEY:
THE SWEATSHOP EDITION (Dec. 30, 2008, 2:46 PM), http://temporaryattorney.
blogspot.com/2008/12/2008-beastly-behavior-award-david-perla.html (awarding David
Perla, CEO of outsourcing firm Pangea3, the website’s beastly behavior award in 2008).
70. Julie Triedman, Slaves of New York, THE AM. LAWYER, Mar. 2006, at 19.
71. See id. See also helpme123, The “Update Legal” Shearman and Sterling Project,
TEMPORARY ATTORNEY: THE SWEATSHOP EDITION (Jan. 28, 2008, 12:16 AM),
http://temporaryattorney.blogspot.com/2008/01/update-legal-shearman-sterling-project.
html (detailing the work requirements for a document review job at New York law firm
Shearman and Sterling).
72. helpme123, Another Assault at LabaToilet?, TEMPORARY ATTORNEY: THE
SWEATSHOP EDITION (Mar. 24, 2010, 3:29 PM), http://temporaryattorney.blogspot.
com/2010/03/another-assault-at-labatoilet.html (“I quit labaton several weeks ago after I
too was assaulted in front of several witnesses in the eating area and no one
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The posts and comments on Temporary Attorney are often ugly
and sometimes contain negative racial stereotypes about the
perceived behavioral traits of various staff attorneys. The anonymity
of the blog forum also makes determining the truth of the posts
difficult. Nonetheless, there are some instances of the blog’s
comments function, which allows users to question the accuracy of a
particular post, serving as a type of peer-review that maintains the
73
Despite the hostile and often corrosive
integrity of the forum.
nature of the forum, Temporary Attorney provides attorneys working
in this realm with a place to vent, to feel connected, and to share
similar experiences of alienation and isolation. Thus, these “new”
websites have opened up spaces that did not previously exist within
the profession’s traditional confines: a public forum for attorney
criticism and a community gathering place.
2. Viral Lawyer Emails
74

Lawyer narratives, in the form of viral emails that receive a wide
audience by virtue of the ease with which an email can be forwarded
across cyberspace, are also challenging and critiquing the traditional
culture of the legal profession. The first widely circulated viral email
of this type originated from an associate at the venerable Cadwalader,
75
Wickersham & Taft law firm in 2001. In a farewell email of sorts
confronted/reported the asshole who hit me to anyone, including me because we were all
afraid of losing our jobs, just as happened to other people recently.”).
73. For instance, the posting about the woman being assaulted at a document review
project was questioned in several comments. See Comments to helpme123, Another
Assault at LabaToilet?, TEMPORARY ATTORNEY: THE SWEATSHOP EDITION, http://
temporaryattorney.blogspot.com/2010/03/another-assault-at-labatoilet.html (Mar. 24,
2010, 3:29 PM). Yochai Benker refers to this process of accuracy questioning, played out
within the comments section of a blog, as peer accreditation. BENKLER, supra note 7, at
76–80 (explaining how peer accreditation works on Slashdot, a user moderated technology
news website).
74. For an explanation of the viral concept as applied to the Internet, see supra note 9
and surrounding text. Neal Stephenson’s novel Snow Crash affords the best explanation
of the viral concept within new media culture:
We are all susceptible to the pull of viral ideas. Like mass hysteria. Or a tune
that gets into your head that you keep on humming all day until you spread
it to someone else. Jokes. Urban legends. Crackpot religions. Marxism. No
matter how smart we get, there is always this deep irrational part that makes
us potential hosts for self-replicating information.
NEAL STEPHENSON, SNOW CRASH 399–400 (1992).
75. See Ben McGrath, Oops, THE NEW YORKER, June 30, 2003, available at
http://www.newyorker.com/archive/2003/06/30/030630ta_talk_mcgrath (identifying this
email as “2001’s most celebrated legal e-mail.”). Although the email was widely circulated
in 2001, it has mostly disappeared from cyberspace, but its text is still available at
autoadmit.com, a forum for prospective and current law students. See posting of h4ck3d
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sent to the entire firm, the author wrote of his perception that he was
let go from his summer associate job because he asked for time off to
take care of his ailing mother and because he spent time at a firm
76
function inquiring about his sick daughter on his cell phone. Lashing
out at the firm’s white shoe culture, the author asked if he was fired
because he “would not eat lobster tails because [he] called them giant
cockroaches” or because of his Italian-American heritage. Although
poorly written and executed, the email nonetheless expressed the
sentiment of a disappointed future lawyer who felt excluded by the
culture of a big law firm and alienated by its lack of humanity.
On May 5, 2008, Paul Hastings associate Shinyung Oh sent a mass
77
email concerning the termination of her employment. The email
was re-posted on blogs and eventually made its way to the Wall Street
78
Journal’s Law Blog, which interviewed her about the email. In the
email, Oh explained how she was terminated just six days after having
a miscarriage. She recounted that just days before her termination, a
female partner simply sat stone-faced while Oh broke down in tears
79
thinking about her miscarriage. Oh wrote: “[w]e are human beings
first before we are partners or associates.”
Oh also questioned the firm’s reasoning for her termination,
based on a single negative performance review, when one week prior,
a partner had told her that her work was “great” and that the slow
80
“What I do not
business in no way affected her performance.
understand is the attempt to blame the associate for not bringing in
the business that should have been brought in by each of you and to
hide your personal failures by attempting to tarnish my excellent
performance record and looking to undermine my sense of self81
esteem.” Oh was commenting on the large law firm practice of
making “stealth layoffs,” which justify personnel decisions in terms of
4cc0unt, AUTOADMIT.COM (Feb. 23, 2005, 5:01 AM), http://www.xoxohth.com/thread.
php?thread_id=140158 &mc=140&forum_id=2.
76. Id.
77. The email was picked up and reposted on the popular Above the Law blog. See
David Lat, Breaking: A Dramatic Farewell (and Proof of Paul Hastings Layoffs), ABOVE
THE LAW (May 5, 2008, 3:48 PM), http://abovethelaw.com/2008/05/breaking-a-dramaticfarewell-emailand-proof-of-paul-hastings-layoffs-/.
78. Amir Efrati, Law Blog, Fired Paul Hastings Associate Talks to Law Blog, WALL
ST. J. (May 8, 2008, 9:01 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2008/05/08/fired-paul-hastingsassociate-talks-to-law-blog/.
79. Lat, supra note 77. Ms. Oh further wrote: “[E]ven a few words of sympathy or
concern would have made a world of difference. What kind of people squander human
relationships so easily?” Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
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82

an attorney’s objective performance, a practice that ignores the
possibility that the large firm’s outdated structure, combined with
83
contemporary market forces, is what drives attorney layoffs.
When the Wall Street Journal’s Law Blog interviewed her, Oh
explained that she wrote the email because she “didn’t want other
associates who may be laid off because of downsizing by the firm—
but told it is because of their performance—to doubt their own
84
This example shows the power, inherent within New
abilities.”
Media, for one person’s critique of a powerful legal institution to
make its way to a mass audience. Although it may not have affected
the stealth layoff practices of the large law firms, the email did
succeed as a comment on the great unfairness of the practice. It also
probably helped other attorneys caught in a similar bind to feel less
alienated.
3. New Media Lawyer Narratives as Critiques of a Broken Criminal
Defense Culture

Online, we have also seen criminal defense lawyers lashing out at
a hostile “judge-centered” culture where prosecutors and judges
employ systemic strategies to encourage defendants to make plea
bargains or waive other rights in an effort to lighten a judge’s docket
85
In a criminal justice system that is
or prosecutor’s caseload.
notoriously overloaded and understaffed, this ingrained culture seeks
to make the lives of the judges and prosecutors, and sometimes even
86
the beleaguered criminal defense attorneys, more manageable.

82. Law Shucks, More Hypocrisy in Stealth Layoffs, LAW SHUCKS, (Feb. 6, 2009),
http://lawshucks.com/2009/02/06/more-hypocrisy-in-stealth-layoffs/ (explaining the phenomenon of “stealth layoffs,” which occurs “when firms lay off attorneys supposedly for
performance reasons, but in fact are doing so by imposing arbitrarily tighter standards due
to economic conditions.”). See also, David Wilkins & G. Mitu Gulati, Why Are There So
Few Black Lawyers in Corporate Law Firms? An Institutional Analysis, 84 CAL. L. REV.
493, 533-34 (1996) (explaining that law firms are incentivized to portray associate layoffs in
terms of objective performance rather than as a result of market forces).
83. See Ribstein, supra note 50 (explaining the current shrinkage of large law firms as
the product of an outdated firm structure and current market forces).
84. Efrati, supra note 78.
85. See Jonathan Rapping, You Can’t Build on Shaky Ground: Laying the
Foundation for Indigent Defense Reform Through Values-Based Recruitment, Training and
Mentoring, 3 HARV. LAW AND POL’Y REV. 161, 162–63 (2009); John Henry Schlegel, But
Pierre, If We Can’t Think Normatively, What Are We To Do? 57 U. MIAMI L. REV. 955,
965–66 (2003) (describing criminal defense bar as a culture that emphasizes efficient
resolution of cases that discourages defense attorneys from zealously advocating on behalf
of their clients).
86. See Rapping, supra note 85, at 162–63, 166–67.
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However, the culture operates at the expense of the defendant, who
87
often receives the short end of the stick.
On Tuesday, October 30, 2006, defense attorney Sean Conway
blogged about his frustration with a Fort Lauderdale judge’s practice
of giving defense attorneys the choice of a too-short period in which
to prepare for a trial or asking for a continuance and consequently
88
waiving the defendant’s right to a speedy trial. Conway posted that
his understanding of the relevant criminal procedure rule was that
defendants and their attorneys must receive a reasonable amount of
time to prepare for trial, calculated from the date a guilty plea is
89
entered. However, in calculating the trial preparation time period,
the judge Conway was appearing before used the date the attorney
was appointed to the defendant, a later date that left Conway with an
90
insufficient amount of time in which to prepare for trial. Using
colorful and irreverent language (perhaps because Halloween was the
next day), Conway called the judge an “Evil, Unfair Witch,” stated
that she had an “ugly, condescending attitude,” that she was “unfit for
91
her position,” and that she was “seemingly mentally ill.”
On the basis of this blog post, in April of 2007, the State Bar of
Florida initiated disciplinary proceedings against Conway, asserting
that he violated various rules, including Florida Bar Rule 4-8.2(a),
which prohibits attorneys from making a statement that the lawyer
“knows to be false or with reckless disregard as to its truth or falsity
92
concerning the qualifications or integrity of a judge . . . ” and Florida
Bar Rule 4-8.4(d), which prohibits attorneys from “engaging in

87. See id.
88. Sean Conway, Judge Aleman’s new (illegal) “One-week to prepare” policy,
JAABLOG (Oct. 30, 2006, 9:11 PM), http://jaablog.jaablaw.com/2006/10/30/judge-alemansnew-illegal-oneweek-to-prepare-policy.aspx. See also Letter from the Florida Bar to Sean
William Conway 2 (Apr. 13, 2007), available at http://www.citmedialaw.org/sites/cit
medialaw.org/files/2007-04-03-Letter%20Notifying%20Conway%20of%20Bar%20Invest
igation.pdf; John Schwartz, A Legal Battle: Online Attitude vs. Rules of the Bar, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 13, 2009, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/13/us/13lawyers.html.
89. Conway, supra note 88.
90. Id.
91. Id. The subject of Conway’s post, Judge Cheryl Aleman, was reprimanded by the
Florida Supreme Court in a separate incident for engaging in “arrogant, discourteous, and
impatient” behavior with lawyers. John Schwartz, A Legal Battle: Online Attitude vs. Rules
of the Bar, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 2009, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/
09/13/us/13lawyers.html.
92. FLA. RULE OF PROF’L CONDUCT 4-8.2(a) (2010). This rule is identical to
MODEL RULE OF PROF’L CONDUCT 8.2(a) (1983).
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conduct in connection with the practice of law that is prejudicial to
93
the administration of justice.”
After a referee’s report was issued that recommended discipline
for Conway, the parties agreed to resolve the case through a
conditional guilty plea for consent judgment, in which Conway
94
admitted to making improper derogatory remarks about a judge.
Before the Florida Supreme Court approved the plea, however, it
directed the parties to brief the issue of whether the First
95
Amendment protected any of Conway’s remarks. In response, both
parties filed briefs, along with the ACLU of Florida, which submitted
96
an amicus brief arguing against imposing discipline on Conway.
On October 29, 2008, the Florida Supreme Court approved the
conditional plea, directing that Conway receive a public reprimand
97
Because the Court
and pay costs in the amount of $1,250.00.
approved the discipline of Conway without a written opinion, we do
98
not know what its precise reasoning was. However, it appears that
the Court followed its prior precedent and applied an objective
“reasonable attorney” standard in evaluating lawyer violations of
99
Florida Bar Rule 4-8.2(a), as opposed to the more expansive “actual
malice” subjective standard used in nonlawyer libel cases involving
100
Under the objective standard, an attorney can be
public figures.
disciplined for statements about judges if, viewed from the standpoint
of a reasonable attorney, he or she did not have “an objectively
101
reasonable factual basis for making the statements.” The subjective
“actual malice” approach would look to the actual mindset of the
attorney and would not impose discipline unless he/she made the
statements knowing they were false or with a reckless disregard as to

93. FLA. RULE OF PROF’L CONDUCT 4-8.4(d) (2010). This rule is identical to
MODEL RULE OF PROF’L CONDUCT 8.4(d) (1983).
94. Brief of Complainant at 2, Fla. Bar v. Conway, 996 So. 2d. 213 (Fla. 2008) No.
SC08-326 [hereinafter Brief of Complainant, Fla. Bar v. Conway].
95. See id. See also Fla. Bar v. Conway, No. SC08-326, docket entry for June 23, 2008.
96. See Fla. Bar v. Conway, No. SC08-326, docket entry for July 14, 2008.
97. Fla. Bar v. Conway, 2008 WL 4748577, *1 (Fla. Oct. 29, 2008).
98. Obtaining clarity on the Court’s reasoning is further hampered by the fact that
Conway signed a plea agreement, admitting that his comments about the judge were
improper and a rules violation. See Brief of Complainant, Fla. Bar v. Conway, supra note
94, at 2.
99. Id. at 6–8 (citing Fla. Bar v. Ray, 797 So. 2d 556, 558–59 (Fla. 2001)).
100. Brief of Complainant, Fla. Bar v. Conway, supra note 94, at 7 (citing New York
Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964)).
101. Fla. Bar v. Ray, 797 So. 2d 556, 559 (Fla. 2001).
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102

their truth.
The Florida Supreme Court also appears to have
rejected the argument that Conway’s comments were not actionable
because they were opinions rather than facts capable of being proven
103
true or false.
In writing his blog post, Sean Conway believed that he was
alerting other defense attorneys within his community to the unfair
104
and prejudicial practices of a publicly elected judge. In response to
the disciplinary complaint against him, he wrote the following in his
letter to the Florida Bar:
The article . . . [informs] all defense attorneys, as well as
prosecutors, of Judge Aleman’s violation of Rule 3.160 of the
Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure. Defendants depend on
defense attorneys to zealously defend their rights. With
people’s liberty at stake, it is critical to point out Judge
Aleman’s illegal behavior to other defense attorneys and
105
prosecutors.
At the end of its Brief to the Florida Supreme Court, the Florida
State Bar asserts that it is acceptable to silence lawyer criticism of the
legal profession because of the important interest of upholding the
integrity of the bar:
Neither the law nor the profession should lose sight of the
obligation of every lawyer to conduct himself in a manner
which will cause laymen, and the public generally, to have the
highest respect for and confidence in members of the legal
profession. When a lawyer commits any act or conducts
himself in such fashion as to cause criticism of the Bar, he
thereby impairs the confidence and respect which the Bar

102. See, e.g., Matter of Green, 11 P.3d 1078, 1084 (Colo. 2000); Okla. Bar Ass’n v.
Porter, 766 P.2d 958, 969 (Okla. 1988); Ramsey v. Bd. of Prof’l Responsibility, 771 S.W.2d
116, 121–22 (Tenn. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 917 (1989).
103. Brief of Complainant, Fla. Bar v. Conway, supra note 88, at 10 (citing In re
Nathan, 671 N.W.2d 578, 584 (Minn. 2003)) (“Merely cloaking an assertion of fact as an
opinion does not give the assertion constitutional protection.”). On the other hand, the
one circuit court case on point, Standing Committee on Discipline v. Yagman, held that if
an attorney’s remark is an opinion, then the First Amendment protects the speech. 55
F.3d 1430, 1438 (9th Cir. 1995).
104. Letter from Sean Christopher Conway to Alan Anthony Pascal, Bar Counsel, in
The Florida Bar 1 (Apr. 17, 2007), available at http://www.citmedialaw.org/sites/
citmedialaw.org/files/20070403Letter%20Notifying%20Conway%20of%20Bar%20Investi
gation.pdf).
105. Id.
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generally should enjoy in the eyes of the public . . . Without
the respect and confidence of the public, it is impossible for
the profession to discharge its duties effectively and
efficiently, which duties are graver now than ever before in
106
history.
The sentiment expressed in the above quote assumes that the
legal profession is in good working order. In contrast to such an
assumption, Conway’s blog posting points to deep structural
problems within the legal profession. Conway was not just criticizing
a judge, but an entire institutional culture that bends the rights of
criminal defendants in order to promote efficient docket management
107
practices. That he called this judge an evil, unfair witch may have
been ill-advised, but these words reflect the opinion of a highly
frustrated lawyer operating within a broken criminal justice system.
The Conway case is one of the first cases where participatory
culture, mirroring the ideals that underlie the First Amendment, has
clashed with professional disciplinary rules, but more such cases are
likely forthcoming. In her comprehensive analysis of the First
Amendment rights of attorneys who, like Conway, are critical of the
judiciary, Margaret Tarkington convincingly argues why the approach
of broadly imposing discipline for attorney speech is wrong from the
standpoint of both Supreme Court precedent and the policies that
108
underlie the First Amendment. Tarkington’s thesis is that attorney
speech critical of the judiciary should be protected because it is, at its
109
heart, political speech about governmental officials. That a lawyer’s
speech about judges is core political speech gains even more credence
when we consider that thirty-nine states elect members of their
110
Following this
judiciary, either initially or by retention elections.
line of argument, the Conway decision runs contrary to the principles
that underlie the First Amendment, namely that free speech
engenders participatory democracy and serves as a check against
111
government oppression.
106. Brief of Complainant, Fla. Bar v. Sean William Conway, supra note 94, at 19
(quoting Fla. Bar v. Wagner, 212 So. 2d 770, 772–73 (Fla. 1968)).
107. See Rapping, supra note 85, at 162–63, 166–67.
108. Margaret Tarkington, The Truth Be Damned: The First Amendment, Attorney
Speech, and Judicial Reputation, 97 GEO. L.J. 1567 (2009).
109. Id. at 1575.
110. Id. at 1577.
111. Id. at 1575–76 (citing Alexander Meiklejohn, The First Amendment is Absolute,
1961 SUP. CT. REV. 245, 255 (1961) (discussing the idea that free speech provides the
means for democratic self-governance)); id. at 1579–80 (citing Vincent Blasi, The Checking
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The democratic ideals that underlie both the First Amendment
and participatory culture would be better served by applying the
subjective “actual malice” standard derived from New York Times
112
Co. v. Sullivan, which would analyze the attorney’s individual
113
mindset concerning the truth or falsity of his or her statement. The
objective standard, accepted by the majority of U.S. courts, is
unworkable because it allows members of the judiciary (the subjects
of the criticism) to decide as a matter of law what is reasonable
114
criticism.
This approach enshrines a traditional view of what it
means to be a professional, leaving no room for lawyers in the
minority who may have a differing view of what is “reasonable” in a
professional context.
It would also be advisable to impose narrow limits on the type of
attorney speech that would be subject to discipline. For instance, in
Standing Committee on Discipline v. Yagman, the Ninth Circuit held
that attorneys would be free to voice their opinions about judicial
115
officers, even if those opinions are critical, harsh, and disrespectful.
Thus, Conway’s comment of the judge being an “Evil, Unfair Witch,”
was his opinion rather than a literal false statement of fact, and would
116
Unfortunately, however,
not be grounds for attorney discipline.
most courts decline to follow Yagman and dismiss the fact/opinion
issue as a “false dichotomy” and impose discipline whenever there is
117
an insult to the court.
A narrow rule imposing discipline for specific factual statements
would uphold professional standards by preventing attorneys from

Value in First Amendment Theory, 1977 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 521, 527 (1977) (discussing
the other core ideal within the First Amendment, as providing a “checking-value” against
the abuse of power by public officials)).
112. 376 U.S. 254, 279–80 (1960).
113. Only three states have adopted the subjective Sullivan standard for evaluating
attorney speech critical of the judiciary. See Matter of Green, 11 P.3d 1078, 1084 (Colo.
2000); Okla. Bar Ass’n v. Porter, 766 P.2d 958, 969 (Okla. 1988); Ramsey v. Bd. of Prof’l
Responsibility, 771 S.W.2d 116, 121–22 (Tenn. 1989).
114. See Tarkington, supra note 108, at 1590, 1607. The problem is that in these
proceedings, “[t]he Court acts as judge, jury, and appellate reviewer in a disciplinary
proceeding.” Id. at 1607 (quoting In re Wilkins, 777 N.E.2d 714, 720–21 (Ind. 2002) (per
curiam) (Boehm, J., dissenting), modified, 782 N.E.2d 985, 987 (Ind. 2003).
115. 55 F.3d 1430, 1438 (citing Milkovich v. Lorain J. Co., 497 U.S. 1, 19 (1990)).
116. See id.
117. See Steven Wisotsky, Incivility and Unprofessionalism on Appeal: Impugning the
Integrity of Judges, 7 J. APP. PRAC. & PROC. 303, 304–05 (2005) (citing In re Westfall, 808
S.W.2d 829, 832 (Mo. 1991)).
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118

uttering bald-faced lies. However, attorneys would be free to voice
criticism in the form of opinions, rhetorical hyperbole, name-calling,
119
and subjective theories. Protecting an attorney’s right to express his
or her critical opinions and theories about the judiciary is the right
approach because it would support a robust, though sometimes
distasteful, discourse that ultimately leads to more transparency and
accountability within the judiciary.
Moreover, the accepted rationale for restricting attorney speech—
that an attorney’s criticism damages public faith in the legal system
120
(of which the judiciary is a part) —is not a strong enough reason to
engage in wholesale censorship. First, as recognized by the Supreme
Court, the proffered fear that the judicial system would fall apart
from untrammeled criticism is generally unfounded and based on
121
mere conjecture.
Second, at its essence, this theory allows one
branch of the government to silence criticism about itself in order to
protect its reputation—exactly the type of authoritarian behavior the
122
First Amendment was meant to curb.
As I will explain more deeply in the next section, the outcome in
the Conway case is also harmful from a professional culture
standpoint because it silences critical outsider voices. When we
ignore alternative viewpoints from within the profession, we are
reinforcing the harmful and hierarchical strains within our culture and
privileging an elite, non-pluralistic view of what it means to be a
lawyer. We should not elevate concerns over the integrity of the bar
123
albeit
and the legal profession above an individual’s words,
disrespectful words, that make a structural or institutional critique.

IV. The Cultural Value of Critical Online Lawyer Narratives.
One might ask, why should we care that some disgruntled lawyers
have taken to online whining about their unhappiness with the legal
118. It would also be appropriate to discipline attorneys whose speech poses a
“substantial likelihood” of materially prejudicing a pending proceeding. See, e.g.,
Yagman, 55 F.3d at 1442; MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT RS. 3.5 (prohibiting
conduct that is disruptive to a tribunal), 3.6 (prohibiting trial publicity that has a
substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing a pending proceeding).
119. See Yagman, 55 F.3d at 1438, 1440–41. The First Amendment protects opinionbased speech because there is less danger that members of the public would take such
statements at face value. See id. at 1439.
120. Tarkington, supra note 108, at 1630–31 (quoting Yagman, 55 F.3d at 1437).
121. Id. at 1637 (citing Landmark Commc’ns, Inc. v. Va., 493 U.S. 829, 841 (1979)).
122. See id. at 1632–33.
123. When questioned as to why he blogged about the judge, Conway replied that he
felt that “[a]ll I had left were my words.” Schwartz, supra note 88.
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profession? In terms of the cultural value that these digital stories
bring to the table, there are two reasons why we should care. The
first reason has to do with the value that the narrative form, in
particular, brings to our understanding of the legal profession.
Narrative information in a digital format, such as blogs and emails,
have been identified as a new kind of literature, like the novel in
some ways, but ultimately breaking new ground with a new, more
124
interactive and sharable format. Scholars have long argued that we
can learn much from narrative perspectives from literature and film
125
that depict life in the law. Richard Weisberg, outlining the history
of the law and literature movement, writes that law narratives provide
126
the “best source (outside of ourselves) of sense and sensibility.”
Law and literature pioneer James Elkins similarly writes that “[a]
narrative perspective is the kind of seeing that places its characters in
127
a world that extends beyond what I, a solitary mind, can imagine.”
Thus, these blog postings and emails, viewable as a new kind of
lawyer narrative, bring value to the profession by offering a different
perspective on the practice of law outside of a traditionalist and
formalist framework.
Second, these messages are penned by lawyers who, for some
reason or another, exist outside of the wood-paneled offices where
legal meaning is traditionally made in our profession. Because these
lawyers exist outside the elite levels of the profession, they can be
considered “outsider” attorneys, in the same way that critical
theorists use that term to designate minority individuals who do not

124. See Steve Himmer, The Labyrinth Unwound: Weblogs as Literature, INTO THE
BLOGOSPHERE
(2004)
http://blog.lib.umn.edu/blogosphere/labyrinth_unbound.html
(arguing that the web log form is a “distinct literary form” that shares many narrative
attributes with the novel); Laura J. Gurak & Smiljana Antonijevic, Digital Rhetoric and
Public Discourse, in THE SAGE HANDBOOK OF RHETORICAL STUDIES (Lundsford, ed.,
2009) and LAURA GURAK, PERSUASION AND PRIVACY IN CYBERSPACE 61–62 (1997)
(situating email messages within concept of digital rhetoric).
125. See e.g., Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Sense and Sensibilities of Lawyers:
Lawyering in Literature, Narratives, Film and Television, and Ethical Choices Regarding
Career and Craft, 31 MCGEORGE L. REV. 1, 2 (2000) (arguing that literature and film
depictions of lawyers function as an important reflection upon the ethics and morality of
lawyering); Lance McMillian, Tortured Souls: Unhappy Lawyers Viewed Through the
Medium of Film, 19 SETON HALL J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 31, 34 (2009) (positing that we have
much to learn from “the portrayal of tortured attorneys through the medium of film.”).
126. Richard Weisberg, Coming of Age Some More: “Law and Literature” Beyond the
Cradle, 13 NOVA L. REV. 107, 110 (1989).
127. James R. Elkins, The Stories We Tell Ourselves in Law, 40 J. LEGAL EDUC. 47, 53
(1990).
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128

fit into mainstream or majority culture.
Carrie Menkel-Meadow
argues that “we learn so much more by including new perspectives
129
and new knowers who are beginning to find their voices.”
For
instance, an outsider voice can innovate within the formal legal
system, imagining new causes of action, new legal categories, and
new, less litigious ways of lawyering such as alternative dispute
130
resolution.
Thus, the narrative approach and the unique perspective that
informs these messages bring value to our understanding of what it
means to be a lawyer in the twenty-first century. We no longer live in
a world where the gentlemanly small-town lawyer model applies to
everyone. We now have a class of lawyers writing about experiences
that differ vastly from the previously existing stories about the elite
lawyers predominant in our popular culture, such as the Harvard Law
131
132
School of Paper Chase and One-L fame or the large law firm
133
culture portrayed by Louis Auchincloss in Diary of a Yuppie and
134
William Keates’ in Proceed with Caution.
Moreover, these new
online lawyer authors—jobless, ridden with debt, and struggling to
make a living in a hostile profession—are experiencing the practice of
law that contrasts mightily with another commonplace lawyer motif,
135
the lawyer as heroic figure advancing a just cause in society. These
lawyers are not fighting public injustice or even discussing the soulless
128. See, e.g., Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, Images of the Outsider in American
Law and Culture: Can Free Expression Remedy Systemic Social Ills?, 77 CORNELL L. REV.
1258, 1261–65 (1992) (categorizing African Americans, Mexicans, Native Americans, and
Asians as “outsiders” within popular culture).
129. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Excluded Voices: New Voices in the Legal Profession
Making New Voices in the Law, 42 U. MIAMI L. REV. 29, 35 (1988).
130. Id. at 35–50. Menkel-Meadow writes about the impact that feminist voices have
had in the legal system.
131. JOHN OSBOURNE, THE PAPER CHASE (1971) (fictional account of Harvard Law
School in the late 1960s and early 1970s that aptly captures the terrifying elements of the
Socratic method through the book’s Professor Kingsfield character, who was later played
by John Houseman in the Paper Chase movie and television series).
132. SCOTT TURROW, ONE L (1977) (Turrow’s memoir of his first year at Harvard
Law School that recounts the cutthroat competition, frustration, and the ultimate
intellectual rewards that came to him at the year’s completion).
133. LOUIS AUCHINCLOSS, DIARY OF A YUPPIE (1986) (short novel about a young
associate structuring corporate takeover deals at a large New York City law firm during
the “me” decade (the 1980s)).
134. WILLIAM R. KEATES, PROCEED WITH CAUTION: A DIARY OF THE FIRST YEAR
AT ONE OF AMERICA’S LARGEST, MOST PRESTIGIOUS LAW FIRMS (1997) (nonfiction
account of the stressful and demanding life of a highly paid associate at a large New York
City law firm).
135. The obvious example of a heroic lawyer model would be Atticus Finch. HARPER
LEE, TO KILL A MOCKINGBIRD (1960).
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but lucrative life of a big law firm associate; rather, they report on the
daily injustices inflicted upon them on a very microlevel. They are,
for instance, berated by hostile judges or spend their workday
reviewing documents on a screen and entering codes on a keyboard,
over and over again. The perspectives that inform these new online
lawyer narratives are culturally valuable because they provide a
competing view, albeit a dark and sometimes mundane one, of
lawyering in America today.

V. Professionalism Issues
The narratives described above do not paint a pretty picture of
law practice. For instance, many of the websites often juxtapose
images of pigs with posts about the actions of the ABA or large law
136
Another favorite visual rhetoric device is to juxtapose an
firms.
image of a filthy toilet in connection with a post pointing out the
inaccuracies in the marketing materials employed by a lower tier
137
It is also common to see vicious character
“toilet” law school.
attacks on persons in positions of power perceived to be responsible
138
for some of the problems within the legal profession. However, the
recurring theme within these narratives is that there are lawyers,
outside of the elite legal institutions, who believe that the legal
profession is broken and feel betrayed by the dichotomy between the
law profession’s ideals, usually expressed in terms of liberal
humanism, and the harsh reality of practicing law in an alienating and
unrewarding environment.
Because these new narratives are often bitter, sarcastic, and
highly critical of the bar, the first reaction of most lawyers would be
to recoil in disgust, brand the authors as unethical or
139
unprofessional, or reject them as having a “sour grapes” minority

136. See Nando, ABA Pigs at a Trough, THIRD TIER REALITY (Apr. 1, 2010, 3:58
AM)
http://thirdtierreality.blogspot.com/2010/04/aba-pigs-at-trough-law-school-is-poor.
html (using a photograph of pigs in conjunction with a post on the ABA); helpme123, 2009
Most Profitable Year Ever for the Paul Weiss Slave Drivers, TEMPORARY ATTORNEY:
THE SWEATSHOP EDITION (Feb. 1, 2010, 5:10 PM) http://temporaryattorney.
blogspot.com/2010/02/2009-most-profitable-year-ever-for-paul.html (using imagery of pigs
in conjunction with a post on large law firm Paul Weiss).
137. See Nando, Call the Plumber: Seton Hall University School of Law, THIRD TIER
REALITY (Apr. 8, 2010, 4:11 AM), http://thirdtierreality.blogspot.com/2010/04/callplumber-seton-hall-university.html.
138. See, e.g., supra notes 65, 70, and accompanying text.
139. The term “professional” represents a higher, normative concept that looks at
what attorneys should do as opposed to what they must do, which is the province of the
ethics rules. See Benjamin H. Barton, The ABA, The Rules, and Professionalism: The
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view of the profession and not worthy of further thought. However,
there are at least three reasons why it would be a mistake to discipline
these authors or dismiss their stories as a minority view of the
profession.
The first two reasons involve a critical reconsideration of two
doctrines that inform our professional identity: the ideology of liberal
humanism and the profession’s codified ethics rules and underlying
norms. First, like most democratic institutions, the legal profession is
founded upon liberal ideals of human autonomy and dignity.
However, in the law profession, institutions and organizations (such
as law firms and law schools) operate in a capitalistic and hierarchical
environment and can actually restrict human dignity and autonomy.
Nonetheless, traditional professional discourse leaves little room for
criticizing the deep institutional structures of our profession. When

Mechanics of Self-Defeat and a Call for a Return to the Ethical, Moral, and Practical
Approaches of the Canons, 83 N.C. L. REV. 411, 440–41 (2005) (discussing how “ethics”
has become synonymous with the minimum rules governing attorney conduct whereas
“professionalism” embodies a more normative standard as to what lawyers “should” do);
Jeffrey A. Maine, Importance of Ethics and Morality in Today’s Legal World, 29 STETSON
L. REV. 1073, 1077–78 (2000) (explaining that disciplinary rules such as the Model Rules
of Professional Conduct contain the minimum ethical standards whereas true
professionalism requires one to go beyond the bounds of the disciplinary rules).
As the example of Sean Conway shows, Model Rule of Professional Conduct 8.2(a) (as
adopted in most states, including Florida) provides a strong basis for imposing attorney
discipline for negative stories about judges. A few states have professional rules that
support discipline for more general criticism of the profession. In Illinois, for instance,
attorneys may be disciplined for conduct that brings “the courts or the legal profession
into disrepute.” See, e.g., ILL. SUP. CT. R. 770. Additional authority for disciplining
attorneys for general critiques of the legal system can be found in the preamble to the
ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct, which exhorts lawyers to “respect the legal
system and for those who serve it, including judges, other lawyers, and public officials.”
See Steven Wisotsky, Incivility and Unprofessionalism on Appeal: Impugning the Integrity
of Judges, 7 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 303, 309, n.34 (2005) (citing 5-H Corp. v. Padovano,
708 So. 2d 244, 245–46, 248 (Fla. 1997)). See also, Preamble, ¶ 6, MODEL RULES OF
PROF’L CONDUCT (2002) (“A lawyer should further the public’s understanding of and
confidence in the rule of law and the justice system because legal institutions in a
constitutional democracy depend on popular participation and support to maintain their
authority.”). Outside the context of criticizing judges or prejudicing an ongoing trial, the
case law does not generally support the idea of imposing attorney discipline for broadbased critiques of the legal system. Such criticism would, however, violate the implicit
professional norms that underlie the ethics rules.
See infra notes 152–54 and
accompanying text.
140. See, e.g., Knut, All You Need to Know About the “Scam-Blogs”: An Evolution
and a Guide for New Readers, FIRST TIER TOILET (Jan. 11, 2011), http://firsttiertoilet.
blogspot.com/2011/01/all-you-need-to-know-about-scam-blogs.html (explaining that in the
first few years of the anti-law school scamblogging movement, “[a]nyone who dared to
raised [sic] his voice about the serious problems in legal education and legal employment
would be viciously insulted as an embittered loser.”).
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viewed from this critical standpoint, online critical lawyer narratives
are doing more than just expressing bitter dissatisfaction with the
profession; they are attacking the very substrates on which the
profession stands. This necessary and valuable criticism may help the
profession evolve away from the elitism and mercenary profit seeking
that seem to plague the culture. Second, to the extent that ethics
rules or professionalism norms can be used to silence critical lawyers,
we should question the premises that underlie these rules. What are
these rules meant to protect and what assumptions are they based on?
Perhaps the rules should be reconsidered if they fail to account for
the values of a plurality of the profession.
The third reason that critical online lawyer forums should be
allowed to thrive is because they provide important community and
therapeutic benefits. With the Internet, non elite lawyers now have a
valuable community space to commiserate, express dissent, and
formulate critiques that could lead to positive change. I will discuss
these three inquiries in turn. In the last part of this section, I will
consider potential arguments against the legal profession embracing
participatory culture.
A. Critical Lawyer Narratives as a Structural Critique
141

Online lawyer narratives provide a compelling structural
critique of the liberal humanism (or liberal individualism) that
informs much of the legal culture in America, including our
142
Liberal humanism exalts notions of human
professional ideals.
liberty and agency but also requires adherence to capitalistic and

141. As a sociological perspective, structuralism has many academic variations but all
of them are generally concerned with studying the organizational forms that emerge from
human interactions. See Bruce H. Mayhew, Structuralism v. Individualism: Part 1,
Shadowboxing in the Dark, 59 SOCIAL FORCES 335, 335–39 (1980). Structuralists are
concerned with “identifying deeper, underlying . . . patterns that find expression in surface
level cultural forms.” John W. Mohr, Introduction: Structures, Institutions, and Cultural
Analysis, 27 POETICS 57, 57 (2000). Susan Carle uses the term structural to refer to how
social structures determine inequalities of power and resources that can in turn affect how
lawyers approach advocacy for their clients. Susan Carle, Structure and Integrity, 93
CORNELL L. REV. 101, 114–16 (2008).
142. In general, the law uses themes of equality and objectivity (liberal humanism
ideals) to foster the ideas that social outcomes are the fair result of neutral processes
rather than the result of preexisting inequalities. See MERTZ, supra note 4, at 4-6, 212–14
(explaining the process by which the law employs abstract and formalistic legal reasoning,
which emphasizes procedure and precedent, at the expense of social context and moral
issues); Jewel, supra note 3, at 1157–60 (explaining Bourdieu’s theory of how the law
emphasizes neutrality and objectivity in order to instill public faith in the system, a process
that tends to obscure how legal outcomes often favor dominant groups).
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institutional organizational forms that can restrict human dignity.
Moreover, generally speaking, there is little room within liberal
discourse for a deeper structural critique of how our institutions
144
perpetuate longstanding patterns of inequality. For instance, in the
realm of economics, rational actor theory illustrates how a liberal
humanist idea leaves little space for a foundational critique. While
the theory that social outcomes are a product of an individual’s free
choice in the market sounds egalitarian and fair, it also operates as a
closed ontology that leaves no room to discuss how most differential
social outcomes result from preexisting differences in capital
145
holdings.
Within traditional narratives about American lawyers,
expressions of liberal humanism assume that our legal institutions
enable lawyers to reside in autonomous positions of power, exercise
146
wisdom, do good things in society, and make a comfortable living.

143. From a critical theory perspective, David Baker provides a good explanation of
the internal conflict within liberal humanism between individual autonomy and
institutional organizations:
[L]iberalism has normative, institutional, and theoretical content. The
key normative content, which is the most persistent and fundamental
aspect of liberalism, exalts the values of human equality, selfdetermination, and self-realization—that is, of liberty and autonomy.
Historically, the institutional content of liberalism has included capitalist
or market economic forms, bureaucratic organizational forms, and, at its
best, democratic political forms. The theoretical content attempts to
explain and justify liberal institutions in terms of liberal norms, and
sometimes to explain and justify liberal norms themselves. In this
theoretical component, liberalism faces the impossible task of explaining
how its key values of liberty and autonomy are consistent with a social
structure that in reality controls and limits human choice.
David Baker, The Process of Change and the Liberty Theory of the First Amendment, 55 S.
CAL. L. REV. 293, 304 (1984).
144. Thus, “[p]rogress within liberal thought requires first exposing the contradictions
between its institutions and its values and then recommending the reform or
transformation of those institutions.” Id. at 304.
145. See, e.g., Jewel, supra note 3, at 1163–64. See also MERTZ, supra note 4, at 212.
The concept of individual merit is another example of a liberal humanist idea that leaves
little room for a deeper critique. The traditional idea is that an individual’s merit (in the
form of school prestige, test scores, grades, etc.) determines where he/she ends up in
society. However, the merit narrative leaves no space for the empirical reality (at least
within the legal profession) that one’s place in society is highly influenced by the amount
of social, cultural, and economic capital one holds prior to entering the education/career
system. See Jewel, supra note 3, at 1173–75.
146. See generally, ANTHONY KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER 299 (1993) (The ability
to exercise practical wisdom on behalf of a client requires lawyers to suspend their own
(financial) self-interest and “clear an affective space in which his client’s interests may be
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There is the view that the practice of law is a privilege because it
provides attorneys with the power and influence that comes with
counseling clients, appearing in court, and otherwise impacting the
147
lives of individuals with the law. But these humanistic assumptions
about the practice of law do not necessarily match the alienating
experience of many of America’s lawyers working in the professional
hierarchy. For instance, autonomy, comfort, and the ability to impart
professional wisdom do not exist for lawyers stuck performing
monotonous data entry tasks for an hourly wage and no insurance
148
A hardworking associate, blindsided by her termination
benefits.
coming just six days after a serious personal tragedy, sees little
149
humanity within her former law firm. A criminal defense attorney’s
ability to serve society is highly constrained by a criminal justice
culture that directs the attorney to make decisions that promote
150
judicial efficiency but thwart true justice for the client.
These lawyers can hardly be blamed for perceiving the practice of
law as an onerous burden rather than an exalted privilege. If the
underlying
philosophical
premises
for
American
lawyer
professionalism do not apply to these attorneys, we cannot expect
them to blindly adhere to the culture’s traditional ideals. On a
psychological level, perhaps these online stories are so uncomfortable
because they question the very core of our professional identity,
which is based on democratic notions of fairness, justice, and human
dignity.
Though unpleasant, these deep questions about our
profession need to be dealt with. Accordingly, these new critical
voices should not be dismissed as unprofessional or untoward.
B. The Rules of Professional Conduct–A Non-Pluralistic View?

To the extent that the Rules of Professional Conduct and the
norms that underlie them can be used to restrict negative lawyer
comments about the legal profession, legal system, or the judiciary,
we should critically examine the institutional forces that shaped them.
A critical evaluation of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct
entertained with real feeling.”); Susan Carle, Structure and Integrity, 93 CORNELL L. REV.
101, 117 (2008) (citing DAVID LUBAN, LEGAL ETHICS AND HUMAN DIGNITY 36 (2007))
(Carle places David Luban’s conceptions of lawyer professionalism, wherein the lawyer
should always strive to promote human dignity, as being based on a philosophy of liberal
individualism).
147. See In re Snyder, 472 U.S. 633, 646–47 (1985) (citing People ex rel. Karlin v.
Culkin, 248 N.Y. 465, 470–71 (1928)).
148. See supra notes 51–73 and accompanying text.
149. See supra notes 78–85 and accompanying text.
150. See supra notes 88–106 and accompanying text.
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supports the conclusion that they may not reflect the views of all
lawyers as to what it means to behave in a professional manner.
Accordingly, current rules and norms that restrict attorney speech can
be viewed as limiting the kinds of lawyers who are allowed to
contribute to the culture of the profession.
With respect to lawyers who disparage the legal system or the
judiciary online, the Model Rules of Professional Conduct are
primarily aimed at policing communication in a litigation context.
The rules support discipline for statements made about specific
151
152
judges and statements that are disruptive to a pending trial. While
discipline may also be imposed for the broad concept of conduct that
is “prejudicial to the administration of justice,” this rule has generally
153
been applied only in a litigation context.
Outside of a specific case, however, lawyers who publicly malign
the legal system and legal profession in a general sense certainly
violate the norms of the profession, as evidenced by the precepts
embodied in the Preamble to the Rules. For instance, paragraph five
of the Preamble states that “[a] lawyer should demonstrate respect
for the legal system and for those who serve it, including judges, other
lawyers and public officials. While it is a lawyer’s duty, when
necessary, to challenge the rectitude of official action, it is also a
154
lawyer’s duty to uphold legal process.”
Preamble paragraph 6
requires lawyers to “further the public’s understanding of and
confidence in the rule of law and the justice system because legal
institutions in a constitutional democracy depend on popular
155
participation and support to maintain their authority.” And finally,
preamble paragraph nine states that lawyers should maintain a
“professional, courteous and civil attitude toward all persons involved
156
Arguably, online lawyers who publicly
in the legal system.”

151. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.2(a) (2009).
152. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.5(d) (2009).
153. See generally, 7A C.J.S. Attorney & Client § 84 (2010) (collecting and annotating
discipline cases concerning lawyers who engaged in conduct prejudicial to the
administration of justice). See also, 16 IA. PRAC., LAWYER & JUDICIAL ETHICS §
12:4(d)(1) (2010) (the rule prohibiting conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice
“attaches to lawyer conduct that inappropriately disrupts the legal process, impairs the
ability of a participant in the process to effectively present a case, impedes progress of the
matter . . . or perverts the disposition of a matter.”).
154. Preamble, ¶ 5, MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT (1983).
155. Id. at ¶ 6.
156. Id. at ¶ 9.
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denigrate the legal system in a way that could be viewed as crude or
157
vulgar would violate these standards.
There are two relevant critiques to the ideology of
professionalism, embodied in the ABA Model Rules of Professional
Conduct (“Model Rules”). The first point of critique is that, as
Professor Amy Mashburn compellingly points out, the ABA’s Model
Rules might not reflect a broad consensus of all attorneys as to what
158
professionalism means.
Professor Mashburn explains how, at the
turn of the twentieth century, an elite and exclusive group of lawyers
within the ABA formulated the first set of ethical rules for the legal
159
profession. The newly promulgated rules reflected the aristocratic
ideals of these “best men of the bar,” codifying the idea that lawyers
should not be concerned with money and that law practice should not
160
At the time the first ethics
be conducted as a business or trade.
rules were promulgated, there was a general fear among elite
attorneys that the wrong (i.e., non Anglo-Saxon) kind of persons
161
Mashburn argues that an
were gaining entry into the profession.
elite group of attorneys continues to define the norms of the legal
profession, as evidenced by the heavy influence that corporate
162
lawyers exercise within the ABA.
Mashburn also remarks that the exhortation that lawyers should
be more civil and polite may not represent the interests of non-elite
163
In fact, concepts of decorum and civility can sometimes
lawyers.
clash with an attorney’s zealous advocacy for a client or for social
164
change. The problem with a unitary view of professionalism is that
it relies on the false premise that the law is a monolithic profession
165
that places all attorneys in the same position. The reality is that not
all attorneys can afford to treat the practice of law as a noble
profession rather than a business or trade. Furthermore, not all
attorneys are in a position to engage in deferential and measured

157. The disapproval of crude and vulgar lawyers can also be viewed as the legal
profession’s attempt to maintain its image as an upper-class culture built around
distinction and good taste. The concept of vulgarity, as a polar opposite to the concepts of
distinction and taste, is a cultural marker for the lower classes. See Jewel, supra note 3, at
1170–71, 1197–1201.
158. Mashburn, supra note 6, at 663–69.
159. Id. at 668–69.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 669.
162. Id. at 672, 675–76.
163. Id. at 655–58, 87.
164. Id. at 686.
165. Id. at 665–67.
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behavior, particularly when they are representing the poor and
powerless or advocating for radical social change.
This critique of the Model Rules can be extended to the Internet’s
lawyer storytellers, who are writing about experiences that do not
reflect the traditional view of professionalism envisioned by
America’s more elite lawyers. For instance, the practice of law is not
a noble profession for a lawyer being paid by the hour to key in data
in an airless basement far away from the mahogany and glass offices
166
of an elite law firm; who must check his or her cell phone at the
167
and who is often berated by
door before beginning work;
supervising attorneys (usually full-time associates at a prestigious law
168
firm) for not keying in entries fast enough. In these circumstances,
the concept of being polite, deferential, and maintaining the public’s
confidence in the integrity of the legal system does not make much
sense. Moreover, if Mashburn is correct and elite and powerful
practitioners have monopolized the task of codifying our professional
rules and norms, then it is a positive development that technology
now gives all attorneys the power to inform the culture of the
profession.
C. An Online Community Space for Disenfranchised Lawyers

The narrative outlets described in this paper have the potential to
influence the profession to change for the better, but perhaps more
importantly, they provide attorneys, shut out from the traditional
social outlets of the legal profession, a place to go to feel connected
and human after spending time in a distinctly non-human work
environment.
One argument in favor of allowing these narratives to flourish
online is that this information could reach a critical mass and
influence true structural change within the profession. This argument
has appeal and indeed, the content of these online narratives has been
picked up by more traditional Internet news outlets, such as the Wall
166. helpme123, The Lexolution Chicken Coop is Once Again Open for Business,
TEMPORARY ATTORNEY: THE SWEATSHOP EDITION (Feb. 15, 2010, 10:15 AM), http://
temporaryattorney.blogspot.com/2010/02/lexolution-chicken-coop-is-once-again.html.
167. helpme123, Discover Ready, TEMPORARY ATTORNEY: THE SWEATSHOP
EDITION (Mar. 20, 2010, 9:24 AM), http://temporaryattorney.blogspot.com/2010/
03/discoverready.html; helpme123 Blacklisted by Lexolution, TEMPORARY ATTORNEY:
T HE S WEATSHOP E DITION (Nov. 17, 2009, 10:08 AM), http://temporary
attorney.blogspot.com/2009/11/blacklisted-by-lexolution.html.
168. helpme123, Jones Day: A Follow Up, T EMPORARY A TTORNEY : T HE
SWEATSHOP EDITION (Feb. 12, 2010, 12:10 AM), http://temporaryattorney.blogspot.
com/2010/02/jones-day-follow-up.html.
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Street Journal’s Law Blog and the New York Times.
Moreover,
after reading the contract attorney blogs, a managing partner at one
law firm decided to integrate a document review department into the
firm, treating its workers more like full-time employees (albeit
170
without benefits). Law school administrators might also be listening
171
in on these painful stories. Dean Richard Matasar of New York
Law School has recently stated that law schools might be “exploiting”
nonelite students by encouraging them to incur excessive debt to
attend law school when there is only a slim chance that these students
will find employment that enables them to keep up with their loan
172
payments.
However, even if these narratives are not able to achieve actual
structural change, they allow these lawyers a small outlet to express
the alienation they suffer on a daily basis. As Michel de Certeau
writes, it is not likely that a single individual, caught up in an
institutional system of power and hierarchy, will succeed in effecting

169. See, e.g., Ashby Jones, Law Blog, Thinking About Law School? These Blogs Tell
You Why You Shouldn’t, WALL ST. J., (Mar. 29, 2010, 1:58 PM) http://blogs.wsj.com/
law/2010/03/29/thinking-about-law-school-these-blogs-tells-you-why-you-shouldnt/; Amir
Efrati, supra note 78; John Schwartz, A Legal Battle: Online Attitude vs. Rules of the Bar,
N.Y. TIMES, September 13, 2009,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09
/13/us/13lawyers.html; Arin Greenwood, Attorney at Blah, WASH. CITY PAPER, Nov. 19,
2007, available at http://www.washingtoncitypaper.com/display.php?id= 34054.
170. Julie Kay, Contract Lawyers: Cheaper by the Hour, THE NAT’L L.J., Jan. 12, 2009,
available at http://www.law.com/jsp/nlj/PubArticleNLJ.jsp?id=1202427338861 (the managing partner stated: “I’ve read the blogs, and we just felt it was not healthy for us, for the
profession or the clients if there’s a bad environment.”).
171. Temporary Attorney: The Sweatshop Edition singled Matasar out for its 2009
“beastly behavior award” because of a perceived conflict of interest for concurrently
serving as the chairman of a student loan company lending to New York Law School and
as Dean of the law school. See Dean Richard Slimeball, supra note 62.
172. Debra Cassens Weiss, Law School Deans Says Schools Exploiting Students Who
Don’t Succeed, A.B.A. J., Jan. 20, 2009, http://www.abajournal.com/ news/article/law_
dean_says_schools_exploiting_students_who_dont_succeed/. In the article, Matasar is
quoted as saying:
We took them. We took their money. We live on their money. . . . And
if they don’t have a good outcome in life, we’re exploiting them. It’s our
responsibility to own the outcomes of our institutions. If they’re not
doing well . . . it’s gotta be fixed. Or we should shut the damn place
down. And that’s a moral responsibility that we bear in the academy.
Id.
Despite being singled out as a target worthy of attack, Dean Matasar appears to be aware
of the problems faced by non-elite students and has compellingly written that law schools
should behave as fiduciaries toward their students, as opposed to self-interested market
actors. See Richard A. Matasar, Defining Our Responsibilities: Being an Academic
Fiduciary, 17 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 67 (2008).
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173

true structural change. But what can be accomplished are forms of
174
resistance in the way one experiences “everyday life.” Thus, these
alternative lawyer narratives validate Certau’s theory that those who
lack power create their own cultural forms in opposition to the
dominant culture as a way of “mak[ing] do with what they have” “in a
175
network of already established forces and representations.”
In addition, these online narratives engender a sense of
community and belongingness. Lonely and alienated in the physical
world, the Internet affords marginalized attorneys spaces that have
the same neighborly characteristics as a traditional community
176
marked by geographic borders. Although they are ugly and full of
verbal wormwood, these online spaces provide frustrated attorneys
with an outlet for dissent, perhaps relieving some of the stress,
frustration, and disenchantment that come from working in a hostile
and dehumanizing profession. In this case, the community function
that the Internet affords should trump concerns over professionalism
and maintaining public confidence in the legal profession.
D. A Response to Arguments Against a Participatory Culture within the
Legal Profession

Worth considering are three possible arguments against relaxing
the norms within the legal profession to embrace a more vibrant
culture. The first deals with the concern that if we relax our
professional norms and standards, more attorneys will engage in
irreverent behavior and the already shaky reputation of attorneys (as
177
evidenced in the popularity of lawyer jokes) will be further
damaged. However, as Margaret Tarkington points out with respect
to the judiciary, this type of slippery-slope argument is based
178
Moreover, although our
primarily on conjecture and surmise.
173. MICHEL DE CERTEAU, THE PRACTICE OF EVERYDAY LIFE xiv (1984). In
describing the alienating environment of modern work life, de Certeau borrows Michel
Foucault’s concept of “discipline,” which describes how modern institutions employ
myriad of micro rules, regimentations, and time tables imposed on our everyday life,
ensuring the retention of social order and the status quo. See e.g., MICHEL FOUCAULT,
DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH 205, 216, 220 (1979).
174. DE CERTEAU, supra note 173, at xiv.
175. Id. at 18, 32.
176. See supra notes 20–26 and accompanying text (discussing the ways that the
Internet supports new kinds of communities).
177. See, e.g., Patricia L. Garcia, Did You Hear the One About the Lawyer? 70 TEX. B.
J. 960 (2007); Ward Blacklock, Lawyer Bashing: It’s Time to Turn the Tide, 24 ST. MARY’S
L. J. 1219 (1993) (reflecting the view that the proliferation of lawyer jokes encapsulates the
public’s lack of confidence in the legal profession).
178. See supra note 123 and accompanying text.
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professional culture should become more relaxed and expansive, most
attorneys, from the standpoint of self-preservation, will adhere to
traditional behavioral norms and will decline to speak out against the
profession with the bitter vitriol and repugnant rhetoric that appears
179
on blogs critical of the profession. There is a built-in disincentive to
stray from the dominant code of behavior because transgressive
conduct carries negative career consequences in terms of the ability to
180
find a job and maintain credibility with clients and the courts.
However, we should not deny the choice of some attorneys, operating
at the margins of the profession, to criticize the profession from
within, even if these views are expressed in unpalatable ways that run
contrary to traditional notions of how attorneys are supposed to
behave.
The doctrinaire view is that attorneys should always “demonstrate
181
a “belief in the essentiality of the chastity of the goddess of justice.”
This quote from the Florida Supreme Court exemplifies the outdated
aristocratic notions that have informed the culture of the legal
182
profession for many years. However, the Internet has given voice to
a group of lawyers who would vehemently disagree that there is such
a thing as a gendered deity of justice or that this deity retains any type
179. To support her point that the judiciary does not need protection from attorney
criticism, Margaret Tarkington cites to an article by David Pimentel arguing that the
adversary system incentivizes lawyers to restrain their criticism of the judges they practice
in front of. Margaret Tarkington, A Free Speech Right to Impugn Judicial Integrity in
Court Proceedings, 51 B.C. L. REV. 363, 430 n.390 (2010) (citing David Pimentel, The
Reluctant Tattletale: Closing the Gap in Federal Judicial Discipline, 76 TENN. L. REV. 909,
933–34 (2009)). The loss of goodwill from the bench and loss of respect from professional
peers can negatively effect an attorney’s reputation and ability to make a living. Id. Thus,
there is a certain amount of self-regulation that goes on within the legal profession. This
reasoning can be applied beyond the context of judicial criticism, supporting the
prediction that relaxing our rules and norms would not unduly harm the legal profession.
180. See Jewel, supra note 3, at 1178 (explaining how the image of the virtuous passive
attorney exemplifies the belief that only attorneys of preexisting wealth and means are
capable of maintaining “professional” ideals). The aristocratic/chivalrous view of the legal
profession is also reflected in the prohibition on direct solicitation of clients. This rule,
now canonized as ABA Model Rule of Professional Conduct section 7.3, derives from the
opinion of the elite lawyers who drafted the first ethics rules for the profession in 1908.
These lawyers believed that attorneys should not dirty their hands by actively soliciting
clients but should instead passively await clients “[l]ike young maidens awaiting suitors.”
See Jewel, supra note 3, at 1178 (citing JEROLD S. AUERBACH, UNEQUAL JUSTICE:
LAWYERS AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN MODERN AMERICA 41 (1976)).
181. In re Shimek, 284 So. 2d 686, 690 (Fla. 1973) (quoted in Tarkington, supra note
108, at 1569).
182. See Jewel, supra note 3, at 1178 (explaining how longstanding professional rules
against lawyer advertising and solicitation were designed to uphold a lawyering model
based on passive restraint, which reinforces the aristocratic idea that only lawyers of preexisting wealth and means have the ability to maintain the dignity of the legal profession).
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of virginal virtue. The Internet is an appropriate arena to roundly
challenge the legal profession’s obsolete and unworkable themes and
author new narratives that reflect an evolving professional identity
(for better or worse).
The second argument is that attorneys should resort to more
traditional means for criticizing the legal system. If dealing with a
problematic judge, for instance, the attorney should make a
183
complaint to his or her state’s commission on judicial conduct or
appeal that judge’s ruling using the available processes within the
184
legal system. What this argument misses is that the beauty of the
Internet is that it provides an alternative way of getting things done
185
without having to rely on traditional institutions.
The Internet’s
democratic architecture allows all voices to be heard, amplifying the
most resonant in a way that is unfettered by the formal constraints of
the legal system. Sole reliance on the legal system to redress
problems would be slow, heavily filtered through formalistic legal
procedures, and would preclude the garnering of mass public support
for the problem.
Limiting attorney speech to formal legal
mechanisms would deny the possibility, enabled by participatory
186
by sharing narratives that raise
culture, of obtaining relief
immediate public awareness and support.
Finally, there is the argument that criticism of the legal system
should refrain from vulgarity and crudeness but should instead
187
However, this argument
maintain proper decorum and respect.
ignores the fact that an idea’s power sometimes derives from the
188
inflammatory way in which it is expressed.
Because the Internet

183. See Tarkington, supra note 108, at 1602, n.210 (collecting authorities supporting
the idea that in cases where there is a problem with a judge, the appropriate response is to
file a complaint with the relevant judicial disciplinary authority).
184. See Witosky, supra note 117, at 314–15 (arguing that if a trial or appellate judge
erred, the professional thing to do is to present the error on its merits to a higher court).
185. See SHIRKY, supra note 7, at 22 (explaining how new technology has created
“novel alternatives for group action” in competition with “traditional institutional forms
for getting things done.”).
186. “Relief” refers to the emotional release that comes with sharing one’s story as
well as possible remedial action by institutions in response to public awareness of the
problem.
187. The rhetoric on websites such as Temporary Attorney: The Sweatshop Edition,
Esq. Never, and Third Tier Reality has been referred to as “vulgar” and “disgusting.” See
Brian Tamanaha, Wake Up, Fellow Law Professors, to the Casualties of our Enterprise,
BALKINIZATION (June 13, 2010, 6:48 PM), http://balkin.blogspot.com/2010/06/wake-upfellow-law-professors-to.html.
188. Justice Rehnquist recognized this point with respect to crude political cartoons,
noting that a cartoon’s success as political commentary seemed to be related to how far it
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amplifies the stories that hold the most resonance for an audience,
transgressive rhetoric might be what causes an idea to gain viral
momentum and reach exponential dimensions in exposure.
Moreover, to impose such narrow restrictions on the means by which
an idea can be expressed runs contrary to the democratic ideals of
participatory culture, which values communication outside the
189
bounds of traditional institutions.
In advocating a liberty-based theory for expansive First
Amendment rights, C. Edwin Baker noted the importance of
individuals being able to control the means by which they express
their ideas and communicate beyond the confines of traditional
190
institutions. Baker wrote that communication outside the bounds of
traditional hierarchical institutions has the potential to advance
“increased human autonomy and self-determinism, and the
191
Writing
attainment of a less alienated, more democratic society.”
before the advent of the Internet, Baker based his thesis on the idea’s
192
democratic potential. As the Internet is now making this potential a
reality, a too-rigid application of our professional rules and norms
should not retard this progress.

VI.

Conclusion

By allowing a wider swath of participants to comment on the
culture of the law, the Internet is changing the face of the legal
profession. The online voices of attorneys are sometimes grating and
difficult to stomach, but they often expose deep problems within our
profession that otherwise would not be aired. It will do no good to
silence the voices that are identifying cracks in the structure of our
profession simply because they do not comply with traditional
professional norms. These stories are culturally valuable because
their narrative approach and outsider perspective shed new light on
what it means to be a lawyer in America. Further, the structural
critique of law practice as an alienating, nonautonomous, and

went ‘‘beyond the bounds of good taste and conventional manners.’” Hustler Magazine v.
Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 55 (1988) (quoting CHARLES PRESS, THE POLITICAL CARTOON 251
(1981)).
189. See Benkler, supra note 7, at 212–14 (explaining the concept that the Internet’s
elimination of mass communication costs has had a democratizing effect on American
society).
190. See C. Edwin Baker, The Process of Change and the Liberty Theory of the First
Amendment, 55 S. CAL. L. REV. 293, 337 (1984).
191. Id.
192. Id.
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undignified enterprise is a critique that needs to be heard.
Accordingly, our professional norms and ethical rules should not
operate to shut these narratives out. In the interest of enriching our
professional identity, we should embrace the participatory culture of
the Internet and allow a diversity of viewpoints to flourish in the
profession.

